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COMMERCIAL LAW
KARL JOHNSON*

Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or
convention, tho' they have never given promises to each other.'

A Survey article is hardly the traditional medium for moral exhortation.
I want to speak, however, less with the academics than with the practicing
lawyers and judges who argue and decide our society's day-to-day business disputes. My intention is to develop a perspective for thinking about
those disputes that can change dramatically the way in which we draft
contracts today and resolve difficulties under them tomorrow-a change
which is radical only because our official view of the law of commerce
departs so radically from how we believe human beings ought to treat
each other.
My plea is this: we must, individually and as a profession, take responsibility for the kind of society we create. Now I realize that law is
not the only way in which we shape our existence together. But it is the
vineyard in which we toil and where, given our expertise, our efforts at
putting plow to earth ought to yield the most productive results. What
we have cultivated, however, should give us pause. Nowhere is the
suffocating alienation of modern existence more apparent than in our
commercial dealings. The amorality of the marketplace as a sphere of
untrammeled personal aggrandizement, the harvest of a thoroughly selfinterested individualism, has become the symbol of twentieth century
life. Transported into the political arena the image has led us, paradoxically, within a powerful central state in which we are at every turn
confronted with rules to guide our behavior, to recreate Hobbes' state of
nature-an anarchy of the war of all against all. 2
Our societal problems seem to us too complex, beyond human ken.
We see no solutions, we find no leaders, we derive no guidance out of
the summation of individual and institutional greeds that the model of
the marketplace takes as the only navigation for our collective course.
There is, however, surprising agreement across the political spectrum
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. For much of the background research, I am indebted to Gloria Crane, J.D., University of New Mexico School of Law,
1983.
1. D. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part II, §11 (1739-40).
2. T. Hobbes, Leviathan, reprinted in, III The English Works of Thomas Hobbes 113-115 (W.
Molesworth 1839-45).
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about where we must look for answers. From the Reagan-rightist nostalgia
for the days when our word was as good as our bond and our handshake
as good as our word to the socialist-leftist yearning for fraternity, community, and solidarity, the quest is the same: for a recognition of our
need and right to rely upon each other and of our mutual vulnerability
and dependence. This view of human relationships-that our fellow participants in life deserve to be treated not as victims but as human beings,
with respect and concern-is central to our moral philosophy, from Christ
(and before) to Kant (and after). But what then can we make of the
reflection of ourselves in the law of commerce, in whose mirror we are
free to use and destroy others in the pursuit of our private ends, if only
we have annointed ourselves with the magic of "contract?"
In last year's Survey article, 3 I tried to expose the conceptual blinders
of the picture of "Freedom of Contract" that prevent us from seeing
beyond this degraded and ignoble perception of ourselves. The picture,
I argued, is an historical anachronism whose only connection with "freedom" is to deny it by supplying a justification for the enforcement of
personal and institutional domination. The law makes a value choice
when it elects to enforce the unbargained-for fine print of the written
"contract" and it is only the mythology of free contract that masks this
ugly fact. For the exercise of official power is no less offensive when it
is enlisted to legitimate private domination than when it is employed
directly for public oppression.
If we commercial lawyers are really interested in making a contribution
through our legal work to the solution of our horrendous social problems,
I suggest that wrecking the edifice of "Freedom of Contract" is a good
place to start. This unworthy construct is at odds not only with our most
basic legal precepts, even in commercial law, but also with commendable
motivations of the actual participants in the marketplace. My experience
has been, and there is empirical evidence for generalization, 4 that business
people are more prone than the lawyers who advise them to recognize
the importance of seeing the other's point of view and to treat even the
purely business relationship as one marked by a degree of mutual concern
and awareness. Worse, this pull of the law toward a baser view of human
interaction undermines any movement in the commercial community toward a fuller conception of social responsibility, as the law's whisper
nags in the merchant's ear, "Go on. It's legal. Screw him."
We must begin by pondering the richness of our culture's view of
human relationships and the destructive superficiality of the notion of the
economic actor. As a result, we ought to gain a deeper perception of our
3. Johnson, Commercial Law, 13 N.M.L. Rev. 293 (1983).
4. McCaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55
(1963), reprinted in, D. Black, The Social Organization of Law 75 (1973).
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clients' interests and correspondingly of what we mean by representing
our clients zealously. For that ethical obligation need not require that we
treat business transactions and disputes as occasions for taking advantage,
as opportunities to victimize. Rather, our zeal can be contoured by the
realization that there is a minimum of humane behavior we all have a
right to expect from each other-a minimum which the law has recognized
in such time-hallowed concepts as good faith, reasonableness, fairness,
and conscience, but which we have allowed the picture of "Freedom of
Contract" to obscure. We can pull down the edifice with a continual
assault on the lie that we don't have a right to expect each other to act
as moral human beings, that we are not obligated to recognize the legitimate demands of others that they be treated with respect.
There's my plea. Now, as good lawyers should, we ought to turn to
the cases; so let me tell you a story.
I. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
Phil and Lena Smith had tired of delivering milk for a distributor; they
wanted to become a distributor. They paid a former wholesaler for Price's
Creameries $72,000 to purchase the distributorship and equipment; borrowed another $26,000 for working capital; and signed a distributorship
agreement with the Creamery. Their version of the American dream crumbled, however, a bare six months later when Price's terminated the agreement. Practically, the Smiths faced financial ruin; legally their trouble
was a clause in the distributorship agreement which permitted either party
to terminate for any reason. Their response became Smith v. Price's
Creameries.' Because of the clause, they didn't get past summary judgment.
The focus of the Smiths' unsuccessful argument, and the occasion for
a ringing judicial defense of freedom of contract, was the unconscionability of the termination clause and Price's lack of good faith in acting
under it. The Smiths contended that the termination clause was unconscionable and therefore void under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code6 because during the negotiation of the agreement, Price's
representative assured them that the distributorship was theirs indefinitely
so long as they performed satisfactorily. Even without the assurance, they
added, the clause was still unconscionable because it disproportionately
allocated risks between the parties.
5. 98 N.M. 541, 650 P.2d 825 (1982).
6.
"If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as
to avoid any unconscionable result."
N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-2-302(1) (1978).
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The court was unsympathetic: absent fraud, mistake, or illegality, a
contract "negotiated at arm's length" is conscionable even though it
results in a "hard bargain or subject[s] a party to exposure of substantial
risk." 7 The dairy's alleged misrepresentation during negotiation wasn't
fraud because it was plainly contradicted by the written termination clause,
the court averred; and the negotiation was at arm's length because the
Smiths were able to take care of themselves. The clause was plainly
worded, observed the court, and the Smiths had plenty of time to review
the contract or hire a lawyer to do it for them. Nevertheless, they didn't
try to bargain about any of Price's standard terms. Interestingly, the
Smiths' concession that they had noticed the termination clause before
signing the contract (although they asserted "surprise in ascertaining [its]
8
specific language and far reaching consequences") wasn't crucial for the
court. The Smiths had a duty to read the contract, whether they had or
not, and were thus "presumed to know the terms of the agreement, and
9
to have agreed to each of its provisions" anyway.
In the court's view then, the obligation of conscience turns out to be
nothing more than a chimera. The party who drafts the contract not only
gets the benefit of the fictionalized assent of the other to all that the
writing contains; that "assent" also is binding and unassailable if it has
not been rushed. Merely by allowing the other the opportunity to hire an
attorney, the drafter is empowered both to include any terms whatsoever
in the writing and to make contradictory oral promises with impunity.
That, to say the least, is a bizarre notion of conscience.
A similar fate awaited the Smiths' second contention: that summary
judgment was inappropriate because Article Two imposes an obligation
of good faith in every contract,'° raising a factual issue of the good faith
of Price's termination. Effectively reading the good faith provision out
of the Code, the court held that Price's motivation and justification for
terminating the agreement were "immaterial" because the contract allowed termination "for any reason."" To demand that defendant act in
good faith, the court reasoned, would require construction of the clause
contrary to the plain wording of the agreement in violation of the principle
of freedom of contract. 12
The court's opinion is elliptical enough to leave plenty of hiding places
for legal snipers. How could the court have decided that the agreement
was at arm's length, and thus necessarily conscionable, without any
7. 98 N.M. at 545, 650 P.2d at 829.
8. Id. at 544, 650 P.2d at 828.
9. Id. at 545, 650 P.2d at 829.
10. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-1-203 (1978): "Every contract or duty within this act . . . imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
11. 98 N.M. at 546, 650 P.2d at 830.
12. Id.
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attention to the relative bargaining strength of the parties or to the availability of distributorships from other dairies without the harsh termination
provision required by Price's (thus giving the Smiths a true option to
"take it or leave it")? 3 How could the court have concluded solely from
an examination of the procedural regularity of the transaction that the
termination clause was conscionable, without an inquiry into whether the
term was nevertheless so "one-sided" and "oppressive" as to be fatally
objectionable? 4 How could the court have ignored that the Code explicitly
prohibits a waiver of the good faith obligation attached to every Article
Two contract?' 5 How could the court consequently have ignored that
contract terms implied by law, like the obligation of good faith, often
supercede the parties' agreed terms, and that such obligations normally
are implied precisely because the law chooses to limit the freedom of
contract? Alternatively, if the court's premise was that the obligation of
good faith applies only to the "performance or enforcement" of contracts, 6 why is there no argument for the dubious proposition that exercise
of a termination right is neither? 7 Even if the good faith obligation of
the Code were insufficient to carry the day for the Smiths, either because
it does not extend to termination of contracts or because it is limited to
mere honesty and reasonable commercial standards,' 8 why is there no
discussion of common law principles of fairness and good faith available
to supplement the Code's provisions?' 9 Indeed, why is Article Two even
applicable to a dispute that doesn't concern a transaction in goods?2"
The pervasive vulnerability of the court's argument, however, merely
confirms the pointlessness of doctrinal sniping, and suggests that only a
frontal assault has any hope of dispelling the myth of "Freedom of
Contract." For so long as the court feels that it is protecting liberty by
enforcing the sanctity of the written document, even the most agile legal
maneuvers within the theater that the court has chosen will fail to inject
the values of fairness and community into the contractual setting.
Once the myth is exposed as an utter falsification of reality, which
13. See Lynch v. Santa Fe Nat'l Bank, 97 N.M. 554, 627 P.2d 1247 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
June 30, 1981 (No. 4900), discussed in Johnson, supra note 3, at 294-301.
14. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-302, official comment 1 (1978).
15. Id. §55-1-102 (1978).
16. See supra note 10.
17. Compare Restatement (Second) of Contracts §205 comment e (1981) (good faith in the
"performance and enforcement" of contracts prohibits abuse of the power to terminate) with
Summers, "Good Faith" in General ContractLaw and the Sales Provisionsof the Uniform Commercial
Code, 54 Virginia L. Rev. 195, 252 (1968) (such a reading of the statutory language is questionable).
18. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§55-1-201(19) ("'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned.") and 55-2-103(1)(b) (1978) (" 'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means
honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.")
19. Id. § 55-1-103 (1978): "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this act, the principles
of law and equity . . . shall supplement its provisions."
20. Id. § 55-2-102 (1978): "this article applies to transactions in goods.
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bestows its mantle of protection not upon liberty and justice but upon
domination and the regressive redistribution of wealth and resources to
the more powerful,' our imagination loses its shackles. We have before
us the opportunity for a fresh start, to think anew how the law can best
protect our liberty and our humanity. In last year's Survey article, I
suggested that our court of appeals had begun to chart the new direction
2
in its disregard of the fine print of an insurance contract. Unbargainedfor form clauses are a product of mutual assent and are thus enforceable,
the court of appeals reasoned, only if they satisfy the reasonable expectations of the non-drafting party. That perspective, which I argued cannot23
logically or practically be confined to the realm of insurance contracts,
clearly stakes out for the judiciary a much broader role than the minimalist
function of the court as mere parser of the written word. The role is
thoroughly traditional, however, in its insistence that mutual assent is the
heart of contract law. It only beckons the deviationist away from a fixation
upon the importance of a signature on a piece of paper, and back to the
original insight that the writing is not the agreement but merely some
evidence of the agreement.24
Phil and Lena Smith's situation, however, now becomes potentially
troubling, for they conceded that they read the termination clause. Didn't
they decide after reading it to take the risk of an arbitrary termination?
And because they freely elected to accept the peril, how can the law
respect their dignity and autonomy except by holding them responsible
for their foolishness? The answers to those last questions appear deceptively clear because they arise within, and take their meaning from, the
myth of "Freedom of Contract"-a myth whose stage is peopled by selfinterested economic atoms, devoid of social duty to each other. These
actors, who like Wild Bill Hickok must sit forever with their backs to
the wall to avoid surprise from behind, have only themselves to blame
if their assassins find them seated elsewhere. But is there really no richer
conception of "freedom" to which we can aspire?
Phil and Lena Smith may have had a different notion. Ponder this:
how could they possibly assert that they read the perfectly understandable
termination clause but were surprised by its "far reaching consequences?"
One explanation of why the Smiths might have understood but yet not
understood is that they may not have realized that they were really empowering the dairy to terminate "for any reason" because, they claimed,
Price's had assured them that it wouldn't. Here the court's admonition
21. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 301.
22. Id. at 304-08, discussing Stock v. ADCO General Corp., 96 N.M. 544, 632 P.2d 1182 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 96 N.M. 543, 632 P.2d 1181 (1981).
23. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 306-07.
24. The insight is repeatedly proclaimed in the Code itself. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 55-2204, 55-2-207, 55-2-316, 55-2-719 (1978).
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amounts not only to "Pay attention to unforeseen eventualities that you
had no call to think about;" but also "Pay attention to those that you had
good reason not to think about!" "[I]n the face of the clear wording of
• ..the termination clause," the court says, "the oral statement of Price's
made prior to execution of the agreement cannot be deemed to constitute
fraud or misrepresentation." 25 The court doesn't say why, but its implicit
suggestion is that the Smiths' reliance on the oral representation couldn't
have been reasonable in light of the written clause. The utterly unfounded
assumption of this position is that people read and understand and take
the writing as the "agreement," wholly apart from the words and behavior
of the other party. The practical and doctrinal effect of the position is to
supply an unfettered license for pre-contractual deception, if only the lies
are contradicted by language embedded somewhere in the written document.
Second, and I think most significantly, even had the Smiths both paid
attention to what they read and ignored what they were told, perhaps
they didn't "understand" because it just never entered their heads that
the clause really meant what the dairy claimed, and the court held, it
said: that they could be ruined at Price's absolute whim. We might imagine
the Smiths saying in retrospect: "But we didn't dream that 'for any reason'
meant 'for any reason'-that Price's could be so ruthless as to terminate
us unless we did something to deserve it." Of course the Smiths may
have done something to deserve it; they may have been lousy distributors
whom Price's had very good reason to terminate. So Price's may not
have been ruthless at all. The point is that we don't learn whether they
were or not because that is,in the court's view, irrelevant. It upheld the
summary judgment because as a matter of law, they had a right to be
ruthless.
Here we arrive at the heart of the issue: our court and the Smiths have
radically conflicting pictures of the nature of human relationships in the
business world. In the court's view, people who step into the sphere of
commerce become gamblers, 26 motivated solely by their own self-interest
and burdened by no social duty to take into account the interests of others.
For the Smiths, however, human beings are not, simply by virtue of
participation in commerce, stripped of their humanity. Because the pursuit
of our economic interests occurs within a larger framework of basic
decency and fairness, we expect that those with whom we deal will not
act in flagrant disregard of our concerns. Not only can we trust others to
do what they say; we understand what they have said only within this
context of mutual vulnerability and respect. The written clause can thus
25. 98 N.M. at 544, 650 P.2d at 828.
26. The analogy is Roberto Unger's, and I am indebted to him for far more. His thoughts were
the inspiration for many of mine in this article. See Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement,
96 Harv. L' Rev. 563, 616-49 (1983).
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supply "agreement" only if the court has already assumed a particular
model of human relationships, for what has been assented to depends on
the social context and cannot define it.
The Smiths have truly assented to the tyranny of the term only if, and
not because, they are gamblers. Whether they are-the normative choice
of the social context-is an unavoidable assumption that the court must
make. Consequently the law, and not the parties, must take full responsibility for the stark vision of human nature with which the Smiths find
themselves imbued; in the court's view, they took the risk, gambling that
Price's would act decently-reasonably, in good faith and good conscience-and they lost. The law, therefore, adopts the unseemly role of
exercising the power of the state to protect the party who defeats these
thoroughly laudable human expectations.
Once we recognize that there is a choice to be made, however, the law
is no longer forced to demean us. It can take good faith, fairness, reasonability and conscience as the model of human relationships in the
marketplace as in all other contexts of our lives (for the major part of
our moral discourse involves assessing blame and responsibility for the
failure to take the concerns of others into account). And it can simply
assert that this model cannot be waived: that the ethics of commerce are,
quite simply, those of human relations generally.
This assumption on moral grounds is certainly no less respectable than
the assumption of the ethics of cutthroat self-interest, which is in fact the
choice that the court has made. But even on doctrinal grounds, it reflects
far better the wisdom of our legal heritage. The judiciary's abdication of
its role as the voice of fairness in the market place, and the corresponding
disappearance of notions of social duty from this sphere of human intercourse, is a relatively recent phenomenon. 27 A response to nineteenth
century laissez-faire liberalism, constriction of the law's function to mere
implementation of the will of individuals was a dramatic schism with the
then-traditional view that contractual liability was based on communityrooted values of fairness. Earlier jurisprudence could not escape the imperative of normative choice because it saw the binding nature of contract
as a creation of law rather than of individual will. Courts were forced,
consciously and explicitly, to define the underlying social background
against which agreements were to be understood and enforced.
The history of the "new" role of law in contract has been the progressive diminution of the enclave that nineteenth century courts attempted to stake out for the untrammeled exercise of individual will. That
radical picture of the moral emptiness of human nature and social relations
27. The following historical and doctrinal synopsis draws heavily upon the work of P. Atiyah,
The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979); G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract (1974); L.
Friedman, Contract Law in America (1965); M. Horowitz, the Transformation of American Law,
1780-1860 (1977); and Unger, supra note 26.
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always clashed with the criterion of reasonableness that formed the heart
of tort law and from which contractual liability (in the form of assumpsit)
grew. Nor was "Freedom of Contract" ever able to bring within its domain
whole classes of agreements-familial and other non-economic arrangements, money lending, insurance, trusts-which kept at their core the
older visions of community-based sources of social duty. Neither could
it prevent the successive flight, in the face of the realities of the industrial
revolution, of most of its remaining subject matter back into the realm
from which it had come. One by one, legislatures and courts themselves
carved out huge chunks of contract law-the law of corporations, business
regulation, antitrust, labor relations, consumer protection, social welfare
redistributions-and reintroduced into them the world of social responsibility. Finally, even the now-eviscerated corpus of private unregulated
economic transactions that contract law could still call its own caved to
continual assaults in the name of constructive and implied contracts, of
restitution and reliance: compulsory obligations all, fashioned out of the
law's sense of fairness with utter disregard for the will of the parties.
All that remained to close the circle around the aberration of "Freedom
of Contract" was the official proclamation of what Grant Gilmore unofficially had announced as the The Death of Contract.28 It came, for
those who would hear, in the Uniform Commercial Code, a document
whose fundamental insight is that the commercial world does in fact, and
ought to, see its participants as human beings and not as a procession of
victims and victimizers. The moral background against which all contracting is conducted, the Code announces, is one of good faith, conscience and reason; and because it is the background and thus the unstated
context against which all commercial agreements must be read and understood, it may not be waived. 29
Because the Code was a product of compromise, its call to social
responsibility is not uniformly as unmuted as it is, for instance, in the
open and unrestricted invitation of the unconscionability provision,3" or
in the emasculation of liquidated damages clauses in the interest of fairness.31 The Code's duty of good faith, by contrast, requires mere honesty
28. See Gilmore, supra note 27.
29. N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-1-102 (1978).
30. See supra note 6 for the text of the unconscionability provision.
31.
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only
at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm
caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss and the inconvenience or
nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-718(1) (1978); Gellhom, Limitations on Contract Termination RightsFranchise Cancellations, 1967 Duke L.J. 465, 511-13, has correctly suggested that this provision
supplies a suitable analogy for dealing with the fairness of termination clauses: they ought to be
enforceable only if the conditions creating a right to terminate bear a reasonable relationship to the
risks and benefits of the agreement.
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(but, for the merchant, also reasonable and fair commercial practices).3"
But courts which have perceived that the moral background ought to
incorporate more than mere honesty,33 and the drafters of the new contracts
34
Restatement who have imposed the duty of "good faith and fair dealing"
to prohibit all conduct that violates "community standards of decency,
fairness or reasonableness,' ' 35 have had no trouble mining the common
law to take the Code's insight to its conclusion. What we expect of human
relationships in all other spheres of life, they have said, does not suddenly
disappear when money is involved; here too we must take into account
the interests of others and the effects of our actions upon them. Our
supreme court, too, has at times shared that insight. Barely a year ago,
it refused to allow a lessor to withhold consent to a sublease arbitrarily
because the lease was "governed by general contract principles of good
faith and commercial reasonableness. . . .New Mexico law has consistently required fairness, justice and right dealing in all commercial practices and transactions." 36
So what I have said amounts to this. The court's search for consistency
in its quest for justice is doomed-and worse, the court is made the
standard bearer of injustice-by the seductiveness of a conceptual framework whose most remarkable feature is its testimony to the awesome,
power of myth over the human imagination. How can it continue to hold
us so tightly within the orbit of its empty shell-its substance gone, its
justification in tatters, its plausibility discredited and rejected by the very
body of doctrine in which its ghost plays so prominent a role? And yet
it pesters us: "The law cannot be an arbiter of morals. We must be free
to choose our moral standards, to define for ourselves what is 'fair."'
The Code and the Restatement and our own court at times-and in
fact all of our law before and since this perverse nineteenth century
aberration-reply: the law cannot avoid it. The problem of normative
choice only arises when what the parties have chosen is itself called into
question by competing visions of the moral and social background of
their relationship. Then the court has no alternative but to act as moral
arbiter. For if what we do and say has meaning only in context (an insight
that is the conceptual revolution of the twentieth century, sweeping before
it classical formalism in whatever guise-science, music, art, philosophy
and, of course, law) then an agreement makes no sense torn from its
place within our larger and unstated understandings about our "forms of
32. See supra note 18.
33. See Summers, supra note 17, for a thorough survey of the great depth courts have found in
the common law obligation of good faith.
34. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981) (emphasis added).
35. Id. comment a.
36. Boss Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill, 97 N.M. 239, 241, 638 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1982).
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life." 37 This moral and social background of human relationships informs
what we conceive of ourselves as doing, allowing us to decide some
things without having to decide all things anew each time we act or speak.
More concretely, the parties to a contract don't define "fairness" by their
words, but rather their words are intelligible only within a context of
moral and social values about human behavior.
If this is so, we lawyers and judges are, with our clients and litigants,
engaged in the continual process of defining and refining, of creating,
the world in which we wish to live. We do choose the ways in which we
view ourselves and others, not through our "choice" of contract language,
but through our communal struggle for a deeper awareness of how we
ought to live together. The continuing pretense that our enforcement of
moral standards (or the lack of them) is justified by individual acts of
will merely provides us with an excuse for evading the responsibility for
what we, collectively as a profession and an institution, have wrought.
It is only this pretense that rationalizes the law's ignoble role as protector
of the tyrant, enforcing the crime because the victim unwittingly trusted
her fellow human being with the weapon.
II. THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY
"I feel the air of other planets," 38 sings Schoenberg's soprano as she
opens the last movement of the Second Quartet, heralding music's liberation from the constraints of classical tonality. We, too, breathe new
air when we step from the oppressive domain of "Freedom of Contract"
into realms animated by a radically different vision of social existence.
Intriguingly, we can make our interplanetary voyage without leaving
home, for both within the area of law we call "commercial," and within
our courts' decisions in that area during this Survey year, the alternative
vision is thriving-in the law of insurance and of business associations,
both of which have roots in concepts of agency that pre-existed the reign
of "Freedom of Contract" and never fell victim to its power.
A. Insurance
The coexistence of opposite pictures of the world--defying logic to
become the mother of history, as Hegel taught us-is always a difficult
predicament: in its presence we are snared by ambivalence and beyond
each exit lies contradiction. Across the threshold between two worlds
stands the decision in Omni Aviation Managers,Inc. v. Buckley.39 Buckley
37. The phrase belongs to L. Wittingenstein, Philosophical Investigations, e.g., 23 (3d ed.
1967).
38. S.George in A. Schoenberg, Second Quartet, Opus 10, Fourth Movement (1907-8).
39. 97 N.M. 477, 641 P.2d 508 (1982).
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rented an airplane from Avcor, wrecked it, and paid the deductible to
Avcor on its insurance. Omni, Avcor's insurer, paid Avcor the remainder
of the loss. As Avcor's subrogee, it then sued Buckley for reimbursement,
relying on a general indemnification clause in Avcor's standard form rental
agreement, which Buckley had signed. Buckley, however, took refuge
in the immediately preceding clause, discovering that he had only agreed
to pay for any loss "not covered by insurance." That was not enough,
decided the trial court, to overcome the more general provision by which
Buckley had agreed to indemnify Avcor against "all loss . . . in connection with the foregoing contract," and so gave judgment for Omni.
The supreme court reversed, but it had to maneuver through a minefield
to get there. First, the court observed, this transaction was a bailment,
and clauses exculpating a bailee from liability for her own negligence
are strictly construed; they will not be enforced if there is any other
possible interpretation. Given two contradictory clauses here, however,
the exculpation didn't seem so clear at all. But, said the court, that rule
is meant to protect the bailor from the bailee's overreaching, and doesn't
serve any purpose where, as here, the bailor (Avcor) prepared the contract.
Accordingly, the court concluded, "a relaxation of the strict construction
rule here would advance the goals of freedom of contract."'
Once the court had declared the traditional bailment rule inapplicable,
however, it had left its own analogous rule governing exculpatory clauses
in realty leases: the clauses will be enforced, but only if they are express
and specific. 4 The trouble, of course, is that there is nothing very express
and specific about a clause that can be interpreted as exculpatory only
by implication from Buckley's promise to pay the deductible amount, an
implication that is contradicted by the all-inclusive indemnity of the very
next paragraph of the contract! Undismayed, the court dug deeper. The
contradiction makes the contract ambiguous, so extrinsic evidence is
admissible to explain it. After all this effort, unfortunately, there was no
extrinsic evidence, but the court had saved its ace: ambiguities are construed against the drafter who, without evidence to support its interpretation, loses. And this apparently is so even though the rule of construction
must perform the alchemy of transforming ambiguous clauses, unsupported by extrinsic evidence, into express and specific announcements of
exculpation.
You know me well enough by now to deduce that I am satisfied with
the result of the construction-against-drafter canon because it is one formalistic way the court can come to the aid of the victim of the standard
contract. In the court's justification of that result, however, all that really
40. Id. at 480-81, 641 P.2d at 511-12.
41. Acquisto v. Joe R. Hahn Enter., Inc., 95 N.M. 193, 619 P.2d 1237 (1980).
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happened in several pages of attenuated discussion is that one canon of
construction (for bailments) was replaced with another (for contracts at
large). The opinion is absolutely silent on the only matter of any consequence in the case, and that is why Omni, rather than Buckley, ought
to suffer from poorly drafted clauses to which neither party to the contract
paid any attention until the dispute arose.
The reason is certainly not "Freedom of Contract." Here the court is
snared by ambivalence, relaxing the strict construction rule of bailments
to promote that freedom, and then blithely embracing merely another
form of that rule which just as surely limits the "freedom" the court
sought to protect. Further, whatever purpose the rule is supposed to serve,
if it can extract an "express and specific" agreement out of these two
clauses, "strict construction" has become so malleable that it collapses
as a reliable guide for decision. The court in Price's, for instance, could
just as easily have construed the termination clause against the dairy that
drafted it because the clause ambiguously said nothing about whether the
duty of good faith was waived. Why then did the court call the rule into
service to limit "Freedom of Contract" here, but not there?
Because the rule of construction masks, rather than reveals, the ground
of decision, the court gives us no answer. If, however, we shift our gaze
from the writing to what Buckley and Avcor might reasonably have
understood in the absence of any discussion or actual agreement about
insurance arrangements-to the relationship of the parties-an answer
emerges. For if Avcor neither asked Buckley about his insurance nor
required that he have any, it is incomprehensible that they could have
assumed anything other than that Avcor's insurance would cover any
loss. Their reasonable expectations could only have been that Avcor offered insured airplanes for rent and that the rental fee bought not only
the use of the plane but insurance to go along with it. The radical departure
from the model of "Freedom of Contract," and its inability to explain
the decision here, is remarkable. It is simply impossible to understand
Omni from the viewpoint of the court in Price's, for if Buckley were
presumed to have read and understood the document, he at least should
have been put on guard by the general indemnity clause. Perhaps he could
be further presumed to have been only confused, but that hardly explains
either why he had no presumed duty to get clear on the matter nor how
an "express and specific" agreement can materialize out of the presumed
confusion. And even if these ragged edges could be tidied up (by more
presumptions?) it is difficult to see the value in it. The formal explanation
derived from the writing has become so fictionalized that it illuminates
nothing; the court has either blinded itself to reality or has declined to
tell us what it sees there.
A more forthright disclosure, however, appears in the Survey year's
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other two important insurance decisions, in which the court's focus is
explicitly upon the fairness of the transaction rather than upon the "freedom" of the insured to be bound by unbargained standard terms. In Lopez
v. Foundation Reserve Insurance Co., Inc. ,42 Lopez and a passenger in
his car were killed in an accident with an uninsured motorist. Although
his uninsured motorist coverage with Foundation was expressly limited
43
by the policy to the $15,000 legal minimum required by state law,
Lopez' wife claimed twice that amount. She argued that: (1) Lopez had
insured two cars under the policy, paying uninsured motorist premiums
on each; (2) unlike other automobile coverage, uninsured motorist insurance protects the insured from uninsured motorists under any circumstances-even while a pedestrian or a passenger in another's car-and
is not conditioned upon the involvement of an insured vehicle; (3) Lopez
consequently would have obtained exactly the same protection by purchasing uninsured motorist coverage on only one of their cars; and therefore (4) because he had paid twice for the same protection, his beneficiary
ought to be able to collect up to the limit under each policy. The trial
court didn't buy it, giving summary judgment for Foundation, but the
supreme court did; they reversed.
The opinion begins just where Omni ended: the limitations provision
was ambiguous, because it didn't mention the effect of multiple premiums, and thus should be "construed against the insurance company which
drafted the clause. "' The existence of an ambiguity meant that summary
judgment was inappropriate, because extrinsic evidence would be necessary to interpret what the clause meant. The court discovered, however,
that the parties had stipulated all the facts necessary to construe the clause.
Further, not only did the court have plenty of facts; it also had plenty of
reason to decide what the parties had agreed to without ever mentioning
the language of the policy again!
Because the written document dropped out of view, so did the "ambiguity" and the rule of strict construction: both appear in the opening
section of the opinion, solely to justify the reversal of summary judgment,
and are not heard from again. Instead of trying to decipher the writing
as it had in Omni, the court here dramatically shifted its perspective to
(1) how Lopez and Foundation reasonably could have understood their
relationship; and (2) the "fairness" of the relationship itself. Lopez ought
to be able to "stack" the two coverages for a doubled limitation, the court
45
first said, because "it fulfills the reasonable expectations of the insured."
The nature of those expectations are suggested by the court's second
42.
43.
44.
45.

98 N.M. 166, 646 P.2d 1230 (1982).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-5-222 (1978).
98 N.M. at 168, 646 P.2d at 1232.
Id. at 170, 646 P.2d at 1234.
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rationale: "payment of two premiums entitles the insured to two recoveries
• . . [I]t is only fair that the insured be permitted to stack the coverages

for which he has paid." 46 Can you feel the air? We have escaped the
powerful gravity of "Freedom of Contract." The court has conquered the
compulsion it felt in Omni to use fictions to ignore the writing without
appearing to do so, to reach a fair decision by pretending it was the
handiwork of the parties. We have entered a different world where not
only do reasonable expectations count more than documents, but fairness
counts for all.
Keep breathing, now with the court of appeals in Landin v. Yates, 47 a
case strikingly like Omni in the presence of both a legal rule and a policy
clause that the insured had to overcome. The legal rule is that a release
from liability operates as accord and satisfaction: one who secures a
release in settlement of a claim is estopped from then suing the person
who released.48 The policy clause was that the insurer could "settle any
claim or suit as it deems appropriate." Landin's insurer, unbeknownst to
Landin, had obtained a release from Yates in settlement of a claim arising
from a car accident. In Landin's subsequent suit against Yates for damages, the trial court gave Yates summary judgment because the clause
authorized the insurer to settle, and when Yates released Landin and her
insurer, he also was released. The court of appeals disagreed, reversed,
and held that despite the broad language of the policy provision, the
insurer did not have authority to procure a release without the insured's
consent.
No one, of course, argued for "Freedom of Contract" here, for the
battle was over which abridgment of that "freedom" should prevail:
whether, in the interest of fairness, the court ought to protect Yates from
being sandbagged by imposing upon Landin a compulsory requirement
of estoppel, or whether it ought to protect Landin from her insurer by
imposing an equally compulsory requirement of consent. The court chose
the second alternative. Because the insurance relationship encompasses
the extra-contractual duty that the insurer obtain the insured's consent,
the court held, any settlement and release "is not effective unless the
insured expressly consented. "49 Were Landin's consent to settlement not
required, the court reasoned, the insurer could serve "its own interest to
the detriment of the insured," in violation of its "fiduciary duty" arising
from the insurance relationship.5"
The rationale reveals first how far we have come from the world of
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 171, 646 P.2d at 1235 (emphasis added).
98 N.M. 591, 651 P.2d 1026 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 590, 651 P.2d 636 (1982).
Harrison v. Lucero, 86 N.M. 581, 525 P.2d 941 (Ct. App. 1974).
98 N.M. at 592, 651 P.2d at 1027.
Id.
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"Freedom of Contract." There is no pretense that the insurer voluntarily
assumes the duty through an exercise of will; it is, rather, an attribute
imposed by law of participation in a certain social context. Second, the
rationale presents us with a blended model of social obligation, for the
duty is not in the strictest sense wholly "fiduciary." The insurer, in the
court's view, is not a trustee, required to act only in undivided loyalty
5
to and for the exclusive interest of the beneficiary, ' but instead is expected
to accommodate both its own and the insured's interests. The extent of
the insurer's social duty is that it "must in good faith be responsive to
the insured's interest. . . .The insurer must make a full, fair and prompt
disclosure to the insured of all facts which might affect the right and
interest of the insured in the settlement," and then await the insured's
informed decision about whether to consent.5 2 The court, however, does
not intimate that the insurer has any duty in all circumstances to favor
the insured's interests over its own. Given that each has interests in the
relationship potentially inconsistent with those of the other, what is required is not sacrifice of one's own but recognition of the other's; in
decisions which affect both, they must proceed in concert.
B. Business Associations 3
The vision of extra-contractual social duty that underlies the law of
business associations is remarkably similar in both concept and consequences to the dynamic at work in the law of insurance. In each area,
the court discovers a source of legal obligation derived not from the wills
of the participants but from the bare fact that they have undertaken a
certain relationship with each other. And in each, the court perceives
emanating from that social context, the duties of fairness, reasonableness,
and good faith. The resemblance is apparent in two opinions of the court
54
of appeals this year: Dilaconi v. New Cal Corp., and C.B. & T. Co. v.
Hefner.55 The former concerned the duties of corporate directors and
controlling shareholders, the latter the duties of partners.
The court in Dilaconi affirmed a judgment against the minority shareholders in a closely held corporation who had challenged as improper
self-dealing a number of transactions between the corporation and its
controlling family whose members were the corporation's officers, directors, and majority shareholders. The trial court found that all the
51. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170(1) (1959).
52. 98 N.M. at 593, 651 P.2d at 1028 (emphasis added).
53. The New Mexico Legislature this Survey year overhauled the state corporation statutes to
conform with the 1980 version of the Model Business Corporation Act. Because those changes will
be the subject of a subsequent article, this article will not discuss them.
54. 97 N.M. 782, 643 P.2d 1234 (Ct. App. 1982).
55. 98 N.M. 594, 651 P.2d 1029 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 590, 651 P.2d 636 (1982).
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disputed transactions were "within the bounds of discretion, and sufficiently in the interests of the corporation that they should not be disturbed
by the Court." 6 On appeal the minority shareholders argued that the
transactions weren't in the best interests of the corporation and that even
if they were, the additional benefit to the majority breached the nondiscretionary fiduciary duty of directors and majority shareholders to the
corporation.
That duty exists, the court agreed, but its "essence" is "good faith"
and "fairness." 5 7 A director (or majority shareholder) consequently does
have some "discretion" in dealing with the corporation: she too may
profit if she in good faith acted for what she "honestly believed to be
the best interests of the corporation" and if the transaction was in fact
"reasonable and advantageous to the corporation. "" Both of those
issues,
the court of appeals concluded, are factual matters that were resolved
against the minority on the basis of sufficient evidence. Apotential conflict
of interest, then, is insufficient to invalidate a deal between a corporation
and those who control it if it is in fact marked by both good faith and
fairness. That rule is consistent with the prevailing view in other
jurisdictions59 and, interestingly, with the court of appeals' description in
Landin of the "fiduciary" relationship of the insurer and insured. Directors, like insurers, may not seek private gain at the expense of their fellow
participants in the enterprise; but both possess recognized and legitimate
individual interests which they, unlike true trustees," may pursue in
concert with their "partners."
Of course neither a corporation and its directors nor an insurer and its
insured are legal partners, but the analogy illuminates the sense of joint
endeavor characterizing each of the relationships. Real partners were
involved, however, in the second of these cases, C.B. & T. Co. v. Hefner.
The plaintiff, trustee for the estate of a deceased partner in a liquor store,
sold its decedent's interest to Hefner, a surviving partner. When the trustee
later discovered that the partnership also owned an interest in an oil well,
which had apparently been conveyed in the sale through failure to exclude
it, the trust successfully sued for rescission of the contract. The court of
appeals affirmed.
Although the trustee, prior to the sale, was clearly unaware of the
partnership's interest in the well, a unilateral mistake just as clearly
supplies no grounds for rescission of a contract.6 Instead, the trial court
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

97 N.M. at 784, 643 P.2d at 1236.
Id. at 788, 632 P.2d at 1240.
Id. (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939)).
See, e.g., H. Henn and J. Alexander, Laws of Corporations §§ 235-38 (3d ed. 1983).
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 (1959).
98 N.M. at 597, 651 P.2d at 1032.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

concluded that Hefner's failure to inform the trust about the well breached
his "fiduciary duty" as a partner of "full disclosure . . . good faith and
fairness." 6" This extra-contractual obligation, however, is insufficient to
justify rescission unless the trustee's ignorance was excusable: if the
trustee should have known of the existence of the well, then the mistake
was caused by its own failure to investigate, and the breach of duty
became irrelevant.63 Hefner thus argued that C.B. & T's failure to find
out precisely what properties it had offered to sell was in itself gross
negligence and, even worse, that the trustee would have discovered the
oil interest if only it had made a detailed examination of its own files!
The trustee did have the property appraised, but the appraiser unfortunately missed the well too. In addition, the court observed, there were
no other circumstances of the sale to alert the trustee to the partnership's
interest. But if the seller had an affirmative duty to discover all that she
reasonably could, as Hefner's precedent required,' the absence of a red
flag hardly excuses ignorance of one's own files. Consequently, the court
was forced to conclude that C.B. & T. simply had no duty to investigate
because, the trial court had found the plaintiff "'did not view this transaction as . . . adversarial."' 65 The court of appeals then took one last
step: if that's how the plaintiff viewed it, that's how it was-this was "a
nonadversarialtransaction. ... "'
The court did not claim that the law permits C.B. & T. to trust in
Hefner's sense of fairness because Hefner was a fiduciary and thus had
to protect his partner's interests, or because Hefner had superior bargaining power or had been guilty of fraud, or because of any other special
exception that is normally called forth to justify a departure from the rule
of "Freedom of Contract." No, the break is clean, direct, and unrationalized: the court has found a new way of seeing. The transaction is neither
"at arm's length" nor "fiduciary," for the dichotomy has been conquered.
The synthesis allows each party in a contractual relationship to pursue
self-interest but demands that each take the other's interests into account.
And that is the recognition of the value of community, of the human
context.
We have now returned to the place of our beginning, for this is precisely
the model of commercial relationships that explains why Phil and Lena
Smith didn't comprehend that Price's termination clause meant what it
said. They saw neither themselves nor the dairy as gamblers; like C.B.
& T., they instead understood their transaction as a mutual enterprise,
thoroughly grounded in a social context of good faith and fair dealing.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 600, 651 P.2d at 1035.
Id. at 599, 651 P.2d at 1034.
Sawyer v. Barton, 55 N.M. 479, 236 P.2d 77 (1951).
98 N.M. at 599, 651 P.2d at 1034.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Although the contracting parties each had their own distinct interests in
Price's and C.B. & T., those interests are "adversarial" not of necessity
but only if a certain social background already has been presumed. Our
journey, then, has acquainted us with a range of economic situations in
which the law, and not the will of the parties, imposes social duties. The
trustee's role demands submission of her interests to those of the beneficiary, but the joint nature of the undertaking in insurance, corporations,
and partnerships permits the "fiduciary" there to pursue with her "partners" mutual (but not antagonistic) interests. Different still is the "nonadversarial" relationship in which the parties may act in conflicting selfinterest, but only within the context of good faith and fairness that recognizes their mutual vulnerability and dependency. Common to all, however, is the realization that obligations arise from relationships: "out of
the common action, that is, out of what is done . .. [and not] out of
what is said, that is, out of the expressed intentions, or promises, of the
parties. "67
1II. A NEW VISION
I propose now to put this alternative conception of commercial relationships to work. During the Survey year, our courts grappled with a
number of recurrent, troublesome problems of contract law. The resulting
opinions are often conclusory, the rationales formal and fictional, and the
reasoning elliptical. As a doctrinal whole, the cases are loosely tied
together by the underlying picture of "Freedom of Contract," but the
court's inchoate discomfort with the arbitrariness and moral agnosticism
of that view made impossible the articulation of a coherent sense of
direction. This body of law, then, provides an ideal laboratory in which
to experiment with the effects of a radical transformation in our analytical
point of departure. Suppose we reject the asocial atomism of the nineteenth century marketplace as our fundamental assumption about social
reality. Instead, we accept the vision of community and mutuality whose
synthesis we traced in Section II: that contractual obligations arise from
relationships in which promises play a part, and that those exercises of
will can only be understood within the context of social duty ("fairness,
justice, and right dealing," in the words of our court68), which the relationships impose. What then?
A. Contract Formation
The problem of contract modification has long bedeviled the common
law. The difficulty typically arises like this: I agree to build your house
67. Atiyah, supra note 27, at 56.
68. Boss Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill, 97 N.M. 239, 241, 638 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1982).
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for a certain price but, subsequently, I encounter unforeseen difficulties
and you agree to cover the additional expense. When I finish the job,
you don't pay the increment as you had promised. The rule says you
don't have to-because I didn't promise to do anything more than what
I was already obligated to do (build your house). I have given no consideration for your additional promise, which is therefore unenforceable.
A court that is sufficiently moved by my plight may, however, be persuaded to scramble for some semblance of an additional promise on my
part so that it can hold you to your word.
This drama was played out, on just these facts, in the court of appeals
decision in Burt v. Horn,69 but with a twist: there was simply no evidence
from which the court could find an additional promise by the builder to
support the modification. What we need here, the court decided, is a
presumption, and it found one imbedded in a statute which said written
contracts "shall import a consideration in the same manner. . . as sealed
instruments." 7 0 That takes the burden of proof off the builder, and because
there was no evidence that he hadn't made an additional promise, the
court enforced the modification.
The nineteenth century invention of the doctrine of consideration has
fallen on hard times, both in the initial and modification stages of a
transaction, from the judicial rediscovery of reliance and restitution as
grounds for contract recovery. Predating the regime of "Freedom of
Contract" and only temporarily eclipsed by it, 7' both theories of recovery
are rooted in social duty. The obligations arise not from a mutual exercise
of wills but from the unfairness of permitting one party to avoid any
responsibility for encouraging trust and dependence in another (reliance)
or to avoid paying for a benefit retained (restitution). Thus, no great leap
is required to simply dispense with the necessity of consideration (and
with the presumptions and other formal devices for finding it when it
isn't there) when fairness demands. That is precisely how both the Uni73
form Commercial Code7" and the new Restatement of Contracts have
solved the modification problem: fair modifications are enforceable without consideration, and unfair ones are unenforceable even with it.
The advantage of injecting the new vision into a case like Burt is
enormous. The court's attention is consciously redirected to the equitable
concerns which, I suggested, prompt its decision to apply an exemption
rather than the rule in the first place, and upon which both the Code and
Restatement formulations focus. As a result, the parties and the court
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

97 N.M. 515, 641 P.2d 546 (Ct. App. 1982).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-7-2 (1978).
See generally Atiyah, supra note 27.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-209 and official comment 2 (1978).
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89 (1981).
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will be forced to deliberate openly the real issue, rather than be encouraged to dissipate their energies in aimless quibbling about fundamentally
irresolvable matters. For, like the interpretation of the language of a
contract, the decision about which opaque fiction or other formalism (or
which meaning of the fiction selected) ought to determine the outcome
of the case requires a prior determination of the canon's purpose and its
consequent applicability in this context. That unstated judgment, however, incorporates the very normative choice that the fiction was designed
to avoid. Exposing it ought to enhance the quality of decision-making
and, in the court's articulation of its underlying assumptions, the value
of the decision as guiding precedent in later cases.
B. Contract Interpretation
A second perennial difficulty of contract law lies in the attempt to
resolve variances between what parties have said and what they've signed.
That, of course, was also the problem of Smith v. Price's Creameries,
but the disarray of a conceptual system laden with contradictions is Hydraheaded. Its visage in Clark v. Sideris74 is the parol evidence rule: "a
source of considerable confusion," 75 the court ruefully admits, but which
on reflection bears an uncanny resemblance in Clark to the "no-fraudwhen-a-writing-says-otherwise" rule of Price's.
The contract at issue in Clark was a concession arrangement between
the State of New Mexico and Mr. Clark for the operation of a marina,
lodge, and cabins at Elephant Butte Lake State Park. The resort was
dilapidated, but the State Park and Recreation Division had grand plans.
They had told the prior concessionaire, and promised Clark during negotiatioii for the agreement, that they would seek a $300,000 appropriation from the state to improve the run-down facilities. Although the
Division didn't include that promise in its lengthy form contract, it afterwards repeatedly reaffirmed ("on numerous occasions") 7 6 its obligation
to restore the resort. When the money was appropriated, however, the
Division spent only half of what it had promised on Clark's facilities,
using the rest for other unrelated improvements at the park. With much
of the resort thus left unusable, Clark sued the state for breach of contract.
Finding that the promised $300,000 expenditure was "the very inducement and basis for the signing of the concession agreement, '77 the trial
court concluded that the obligation was part of the contract and that the
state had therefore breached. The supreme court reversed, holding that
74.
75.
76.
77.

99 N.M. 209, 656 P.2d 872 (1982).
Id.at 212, 656 P.2d at 875.
Id.
Id.
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the trial court shouldn't even have admitted into evidence testimony of
the state's oral promises: the printed document's silence about the additional obligation was (1) unambiguous, requiring that the parties' agreement be derived solely from the writing; (2) contradicted by any other
promise that spoke where the document didn't; and (3) sanctified by the
document's merger clause, providing that the writing contained the parties' entire agreement.
The court's third rationale is a straightforward application of the doctrine of Price's: a contracting party may promise and misrepresent with
wild abandon if only a contrary clause has been imbedded within the
document. We of course have already thought at length about the deficiencies and alternatives to that point of view, and I might only add here
two observations. First, the parol evidence rule, which originally was
meant to better ascertain the intentions of the parties by excluding evidence of tentative agreements that were discarded and replaced by a final
statement of obligations, has become a formalist device for ignoring those
intentions. The document is now not evidence of the agreement, but the
agreement itself. Second, the revisionism of that doctrinal transformation
is explicitly recognized by the new contracts Restatement: a merger clause
shouldn't be enforced merely because it appears in a document, but is
effective only if the parties have truly assented to it. 78 And that is a matter
that cannot be presumed from a signature but can only be inferred from
a close examination of the parties' relationship, whether they have in
fact, explicitly and together, decided to gamble on the four comers of
the writing rather than to rely upon the entire context of their undertaking.
The court's other two renditions of the parol evidence rule, however,
are even more disturbing. If a writing's silence about part of an agreement
is in itself enough to vaporize the omitted obligation, the court has altogether given up its quest to discern the understanding of the parties. In
its place appears the conclusive presumption that the document alone,
even absent a formal merger clause, has said all there is to say. That
result, however, is untenable even within the picture of "Freedom of
Contract," for the court has not merely implemented the will of the parties;
it has fashioned out of their silence a compulsory, implied-in-law merger
clause where none existed. But the conversion of the parol evidence rule
into a source of legal rights is not only doctrinally inconsistent; its creation
of an impregnable fortress for the contract drafter is a systematic and
morally indefensible preference for the powerful.
The rule appears in a different light, however, if we think of a contract
relationship as meaningful only in the context of the more general social
understandings that pervade it. From this angle, it is clear that the court
78. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 210, comment b; § 216, illustration 3 (1981).
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needs all the evidence it can gather about how the parties treated each
other in order to understand their utterances and their writings, their words
and their silences. It is equally clear that a document ought to be sacred
only if the parties annointed it in fact rather than in form, as a way of
telling a future court to ignore what it would otherwise appropriately
consider. Here the parol evidence rule has a role to play, but in the limiting,
not the typical, case-when both parties have clearly decided to cast their
lots solely on the paper rather than also upon their relationship with a
fellow human being.
The reservation of the rule for the case of the self-chosen gamblers
underlies its formulation in both the Uniform Commercial Code7 9 and the
new contracts Restatement. 8" In each, a writing appears as just another
piece of evidence of how the parties saw their transaction: proof of
extraneous oral agreements is barred neither by the document's freedom
from ambiguity;81 nor by its silence;" nor even by its merger clause,
unless the parties actually intended that the document be the last word
on all matters between them.83 In each, the commercial context of the
relationship is specifically made part of the contract.8" And the Restatement even makes explicit what the Code's focus on the parties' intentions
implies: non-standard terms are "naturally omitted" by all standard form
contracts, whose apparent finality consequently can never be used to gag
the non-drafter's testimony about the additional promises.8 5
"I was dealing with fair people in a fair way," 86 Clark had described
his vision of the contractual relationship, failing to comprehend that the
law could find those expectations so outrageous that they should be replaced with a thoroughly antithetical conception of human responsibilities. But Clark's vision is not outrageous. Its historical and social roots
run far deeper than do those of its nineteenth century counterpoint,87 and
it has found here a modem voice in the Code and the Restatement. The
humble parol evidence rule, casting into bright relief both the doctrinal
inconsistency and the substantive injustice of its formalist profile, thus
points the way out of the cave. The answer lies, it suggests, in a richer
79. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-202 (1978).
80. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 209-18 (1981).
81. N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-2-202 and official comment l(c) (1978); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 212, comment b (1981).
82. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-202, official comment 1(a) (1978); Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§210, comment a (1981).
83. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-202 (1978); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 210, comment b;
§216, comment e (1981).
84. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-202(a) (1978); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 220-23 (1981).
85. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 216, comment d (1981).
86. 99 N.M. at 215, 656 P.2d at 878.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
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conception of the depth of social understandings that give the act of
promising its meaning.
C. Contract Duties
The decay of the myth is even more striking in the anti-contractarian
creation of implied warranties, whose duties explicitly arise not from
individual wills but from social valuations. The decision to impose a
compulsory obligation upon a contract implements a normative judgment
about who ought to bear the risk of things going awry in a given transactional setting. That, of course, is precisely the choice that I have argued
underlies every adjudication of a contract, and which is merely masked
by the illusory neutrality of "Freedom of Contract." How then does it
look when the problem is tackled directly?
In State ex rel. Risk Management Division of Department of Finance
& Administration v. Gathman-MatotanArchitects and Planners, Inc.,88
New Mexico sought to shift the loss from the disastrous 1980 state penitentiary riot onto the architect who had designed the prison's remodeling
plans. One of the improvements was the installation of a bay window in
the prison's central control area. The rioting prisoners easily shattered
the new glass and captured the control area, giving them the run of the
prison. When the state sued, among its claims for negligence and breach
of contract was a cause of action for breach of an implied warranty that
the architect's plans were sufficient "to provide a control center adequate
to serve as a central stronghold in the event of an inmate uprising. "89
The trial court dismissed the warranty action for failure to state a claim,
and the state took an interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals affirmed,
holding that an architect's plans do not carry an implied warranty that
they are adequate for a specified purpose.
New Mexico had long recognized an implied contract warranty to use
reasonable skill of the trade, but that standard required proof of negligence
which the state hoped to avoid. The court argued, however, that the
considerations that led to the development of implied warranties in the
sale of goods (lack of privity between manufacturer and buyer, difficulty
of proving negligence against a distant manufacturer using mass production techniques, and the better ability of the mass manufacturer to spread
risks among its customers)' are not present in a contract for professional
services, where the protection against negligence alone consequently is
sufficient. Those considerations did indeed generate the implied warranty
of merchantability against defects, 9 the contractual cousin of strict 1ia88.
89.
90.
91.

98 N.M. 790, 653 P.2d 166 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 99 N.M. 47, 653 P.2d 878 (1982).
98 N.M. at 792, 653 P.2d at 168.
Id. at 794, 653 P.2d at 170.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-2-314 (1978).
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bility in tort. But the analogy the state sought here was to the different
warranty of fitness of goods for a particular purpose.92 This obligation
was born neither of the difficulty of recovery nor of the perceived fairness
of redistribution of the loss from an aberrational defect, but of the need
to protect the buyer who relies on the seller's skill and judgment to supply
the right product for a particular job. The court thus distinguished the
wrong warranty and left unrebutted the clear parallel of the fitness warranty with the state's reliance upon the architect to specify the appropriate
of glass for the control center.
kind
Although
the court provided no additional rationale, it thrice cited as
support but without explanation a Minnesota decision93 that offers a different reason why the sale of goods is unlike a contract for professional
services. Professionals deal in sciences rife with random, unmeasurable
factors and pervaded with the inescapable possibility of error, the Minnesota court observed; we consequently may justifiably expect of professionals diligent "state-of-the-art design techniques," but we may not fairly
expect the "perfect results" required by a warranty of fitness.94 Thus, the
Minnesota opinion concluded, "we do not think it just that architects
should be forced to bear the same burden of liability for their products" 95
as are sellers and manufacturers of goods.
The "inexact science" rationale appears at first to provide little succor
to the prison architect who had no "random factors" to struggle with,
but merely needed to supply unbreakable glass. In the longer view, however, the Minnesota court (and the New Mexico court too, I suspect) was
haunted by the specter of holding all professionals-doctors and lawyers,
as well as architects-to a guarantee of overall results. Here the professional is quite different from the seller of goods in her ability to predict
outcomes. A doctor prescribing medicine or a lawyer drafting a document
is necessarily forced to guess about variables (an individual patient's
reaction, a later court judgment) beyond her control. The seller who knows
her product and the buyer's purpose, however, encounters a much narrower range of unknowns and accordingly has a more ministerial decision
to make. Thus, although the "buyer" of goods or professional services
may rely upon the skill and judgment of the "seller" to supply the appropriate "product," the two sorts of transactions are really quite different
in what the buyer ought to be able to expect from them. The disparity
in the ability to predict and control the future suggests that it is fair to
see the extra-contractual duties in the two contexts differently. And I
suggest, of course, that this kind of conscious elaboration of social un92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at § 55-2-315.
City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 1978).
Id. at 424.
Id. at 425.
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derstandings-the investigation of how we ought to relate to each other
here, in this sphere-is merely the vivid display of the normative choices
that more typically are submerged in the rhetoric of the myth.
It was rhetoric rather than reality, however, which dictated the supreme
court's approach in Deaton, Inc. v. Aeroglide Corp.96 to another sort of
implied warranty problem. First, some background: once the decision has
been made to create the social obligation through warranty, there remains
the difficulty of whether, and how, that duty may be overridden by the
parties' agreement. The Uniform Commercial Code's solution to this
classic confrontation of the two value schemes whose outlines we've
traced is a compromise. A seller may disclaim the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, but only if the disclaimer clause in a written contract is "conspicuous": 9 7 if a reasonable
person "ought to have noticed it" or if it is in larger or contrasting type.98
That answer is not a thoroughly happy one, although it does provide
some protection against the surprise of the hidden disclaimer. The Code's
blanket approval of the clauses, however, apparently leaves no room to
examine, in a given context, the substantive fairness of allowing one
party to require as a condition of doing business the abrogation of expectations that the law has recognized as justifiable. Without that opportunity, the recognition is hollow, the duty an illusion. The impregnability
of the bold-face disclaimer becomes an unexplicable inconsistency within
the Code's larger vision that contract is a matter of context, whose fundamental characteristics are always good faith and reasonableness.
The contradiction disappears, however, if we can escape the vestiges
of "Freedom of Contract" that create it, and immerse ourselves instead
in the Code's vision that a license to dominate is not the meaning of
liberty. Then the requirement of conspicuousness becomes the beginning,
not the end, of the inquiry, for even a conspicuous disclaimer ought to
be unenforceable unless it actually comports with the parties' intentions-how they understood what they have "promised" against the entire socially-created background of their relationship. Here the Code is unequivocal: part of that background, as we've observed, is conscience, and
this justifiable expectation creates a duty that may not be disclaimed."
The overriding social obligation thus resolves the contradiction that the
purely procedural limitation on disclaimers had seemed to create. It supplies a means to isolate those circumstances in which the disclaimer ought
to be enforced because the parties have explicitly decided, together, to
eviscerate their normal expectations with a considered gamble. So when
96.
97.
98.
99.

99 N.M. 253, 657 P.2d 109 (1982).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-316(2) (1978).
Id. at §55-1-201(10).
See id. §§55-2-302, 55-1-102 (1978) (emphasis added).
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the Massachusetts Legislature decided that warranty disclaimers are never
enforceable in consumer contracts,' °° where bargaining over warranties
simply never occurs; and when the California judiciary added that neither
are they enforceable even in commercial contracts unless the disclaimers
have really and fairly been bargained;'.' both have truly seen through the
lens of the new vision the Code supplies.
In Deaton, however, neither the lawyers nor the court, reached that
level of analysis. Instead, their attention was focused on whether a boldface notice, on the frontside of a commercial standard form sales agreement, that the sale was subject to the conditions printed on the reverse
side made the fine print implied warranty disclaimer imbedded in the
back "conspicuous." The court held that it did. Because the frontside
reference was "conspicuous," the court asserted, all the fine print on the
reverse was also "conspicuous," and "should have been noticed by a
reasonable buyer.""°2 The disclaimer was therefore valid.
Equally conspicuous in its absence, however, is any attempt in the
opinion to explain why a reasonable person ought to be required to notice
all the fine print under these circumstances. Given the myth's image of
proper contracting behavior, however, no explanation is necessary. As in
Clark and Price's, the determinative framework here is that parties to a
contract have a duty to read and understand, and thus are presumed to
have read and understood, the entire contract (including termination clauses,
merger clauses and now, warranty disclaimers). Because the most basic
precept of civil law is that reasonable people do their duty, the court's
hypothesis consequently mandates that the reasonable buyer would notice
anything in a written contract. And if that's true, then any disclaimer
embodied in a written document is "conspicuous," and therefore effective, because a reasonable person would have dutifully read and understood it. The "reasonable person" test of conspicuousness thus turns out
to be no test at all, and once again the conventional construct has landed
us squarely in the midst of contradiction.
What has gone awry here is the court's picture of how "reasonable"
people behave-they don't read the front side of a standard form contract
(except perhaps to confirm the accuracy of the nonstandard bargained100.

Any language, oral or written, used by a seller or manufacturer of consumer
goods and services, which attempts to exclude or modify any implied warranties
of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose or to exclude or modify
the consumer's remedies for breach of those warranties shall, be unenforceable.

The provisions of this section may not be disclaimed or waived by agreement.
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 106, §2-316A (West Supp. 1983-84).
101. A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Ct. App.
1982).
102. 99 N.M. at 256, 657 P.2d at 112.
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for terms) much less the back side. But the Code can hardly be expected
to achieve its purpose of modernizing the law of commercial transactions' °3
if it is burdened with a rigid nineteenth century mythology of contractual
interaction. Far from responding flexibly to commercial reality,"' 4 the
Code so burdened contorts that reality out of all recognition to force it
into the rigid confines of a pre-determined conceptual system. Were the
court to recognize the reality, it would become clear that a warranty
disclaimer ought to be presented with little less than a brass band accompaniment to be noticeable, and therefore "conspicuous," in the great
majority of contractual situations.
D. Breach of Contract
A fourth problem area that traditionally has tied the common law courts
into knots is the technical breach: whether the law ought to sanction a
minor failure to perform which, although literally a default under the
contract, has caused no harm to the other party. The received doctrine
of course answers in the affirmative, a straightforward deduction from
the conception of contractual obligation as a creation of will to be passively enforced by the courts. In testimony to the power of the concept,
the doctrine even receives an airing in Article Two of the Code: a party
whose performance fails "in any respect to conform to the contract" is
in breach.' 5 As we might suspect from the Code's overall vision, however, that rule turns out to be devoid of much substance. It is laden with
so many exceptions, qualifications, and conditions (not the least of which
are the duties of good faith, reasonability, and conscience) that a breach
is in fact penalized only when it substantially impairs the value of the
performance. "'
The difficulty also arises in contracts involving secured transactions
under Article Nine of the Code. In Brummund v. FirstNational Bank of
Clovis,'°7 the bank held a mortgage on the Brummunds' motel property
and a security interest in its furnishings. When the Brummunds sold the
property, the bank pointed to clauses in the mortgage and security agreement prohibiting sale of the collateral without the bank's consent, and
declared default. Although the Brummunds continued to make the mortgage payments, the bank relied upon the agreement's acceleration clause
106. See, e.g., id. at § 55-2-608 (1978) (revocation of acceptance permitted only if the "nonconformity substantially impairs" the value of the performance); § 55-2-612 (1978) (rejection of an
installment under a contract for several deliveries permitted only if "the non-conformity substantially
impairs the value of that installment and cannot be cured"); § 55-2-508 (1978) (seller has right to
cure defective tender); § 55-2-504 (1978) (rejection for delay in delivery permitted only if delay is
"material"). See also Whaley, Tender,Acceptance, Rejection and Revocation-The UCC's "TARR"Baby, 24 Drake L. Rev. 52 (1974).
107. 99 N.M. 221, 656 P.2d 884 (1983).
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to demand immediate payment of the entire debt. The Brummunds sued
for a declaratory judgment to stop the foreclosure; the bank won.
Where Price's had excised the duty of good faith from Article Two,
Brummund performs the surgery for Article Nine. Before operating, however the court had to deal with the Brummunds' argument that they hadn't
defaulted at all because the Code specifically permits a debtor to transfer
her interest in collateral, notwithstanding a prohibition in the security
agreement. 0' 8 That provision, the court properly reasoned, merely protects
the debtor's transferee, who thus may keep the property, but subject to
the security interest if the secured party has not consented to the sale.,
The parties may nevertheless agree, the court concluded, that despite the
debtor's power to transfer the collateral, the exercise of that power constitutes a default.
After the unconsented sale, then, the bank still had a security interest
in the collateral in the transferee's possession, allowing it to repossess
in the event of default. The Brummunds still owed, and were performing,
all their duties under the security agreement. But the bank also had, in
the unconsented transfer, an incident of default that, under the agreement,
apparently gave it the additional right to call due the entire debt. That
right, however, can only be exercised in good faith, claimed the Brummunds, and here the bank's interest wasn't jeopardized in any way to
provoke the acceleration of payments.
The court"s response was terse: "[w]e need not discuss . ..whether
the acceleration of the balance due bn the note was predicated on 'good
faith,"' because that statutory obligation applies only to acceleration "at
will" clauses, and not acceleration for default." 0 It is true that the Code
specifically prohibits the enforcement of clauses permitting the secured
party to accelerate "at will" or "when he deems himself insecure" unless
the creditor "in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or
performance is impaired. "' Even here, however, some courts have found
little difficulty in extending the protection of the principle to any invocation of the powerful acceleration right." 2 Moreover, the court ignored
the more general obligation of good faith that the Code imposes upon
every contract. 113 Indeed, that general duty requires the court to discuss
103. N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-1-102 (1978).
104. Id. official comment 1.
105. N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-2-601 (1978).
108. N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-9-311 (1978).
109. Id. §55-9-306(2).
110. 99 N.M. at 224, 656 P.2d at 887.
111. N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-1-208 (1978).
112. See, e.g., Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979); Sparkman v. Peoples
Nat'l Bank, 580 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). But see Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n., 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
113. N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-1-203 (1978).
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good faith, Brummund and Price'snotwithstanding, whenever it is raised
in a dispute that the Code governs.
The court's reluctance to examine the fairness of acceleration where
the secured party apparently has suffered no harm stands in stark contrast
to its treatment of the nearly identical problem in real property mortgages.
There "due-on-sale" clauses, the realty version of acceleration, have been
struck down as unreasonable restraints on alienation absent a showing of
substantial impairment to the lender's security interest." 4 The court in
Brummund recognized the inconsistency, and attempted to explain it by
reiterating that the Code specifically allows both (1) the debtor to transfer
the collateral and (2) the parties to denominate the transfer a default. That
must mean, the court concluded, that the Code has approved the contractual restraint on sale and has displaced the common law. But the
restraint in the "due-on-sale" clause is created not by any contractual
prohibition of sale, but by the threat of acceleration that severely penalizes
the sale. This threat is exactly the same when personal property is involved, and it has in no wise been blessed with the Code's blanket
approval. The Code requires that the acceleration must at least be exercised in good faith," 5 but that obligation leaves ample room for the
application of additional supplementary common law principles. 116 Those
principles here, drawn from the "due-on-sale" cases, suggest that the
appropriate standard for Article Nine acceleration requires that the secured
party's belief in the impairment of her interest must be not bnly in good
faith but also, in fact, reasonable.
That suggestion is reinforced if we now rethink whether there had been
a default at all in Brummund.. The justification for acceleration was the
debtor's failure to obtain the bank's consent to sale of the collateral; but
if the bank could not legally have withheld consent, the Brummunds'
omission becomes irrelevant. The bank apparently could not have refused
consent for any reason, because a contract clause giving one party the
power of consent over the other's actions may not be wielded arbitrarily.
Rather, the consent may be withheld only if the refusal is in good faith,
fair, and commercially reasonable. 7 Thus, if the transfer did not actually
impair the security interest, the bank could not have justified, regardless
of its good faith, even the declaration of a default, and much less the
consequent acceleration.
The prohibition of "due-on-sale" and "arbitrary consent" clauses clashes
so stridently with Brummund's free acceleration doctrine precisely because they emanate from fundamentally irreconcilable world views. The
114.
115.
116.
117.

State ex rel. Bingaman v. Valley Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 97 N.M. 8, 636 P.2d 279 (1981).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-1-208 (1978).
Id. § 55-1-103; see generally Summers, supra note 17.
Boss Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill, 97 N.M. 239, 241, 638 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1982).
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former, like the Code itself, represents a normative choice, derived from
social values rather than from individual power, to restrain the unlimited
ability of one party to use contractual rights to dominate the affairs and
property of another. The latter is just as surely a normative choice, but
the failure to recognize it, the refusal even to discuss whether the contract
power exerted bore a fair relationship to the needs and interests affected,
has its cost in contradiction: in the name of freedom, the law denies it.
IV. CONCLUSION
We humans don't have everything, but neither have we nothing; for
we have each other. We care and we sympathize. We excuse and we
justify. We condemn and we praise. Our lives are thus defined in the
unceasing pursuit of our place: how, now and in these circumstances, do
we fit together with our fellows? The creation of self, just as surely as
the creation of our world, is a social activity, which means that I can't
know who "I" am without also knowing who "you" are and what "we"
are together. To pretend otherwise-to pretend that we are alone in a sea
of four billion other human beings-is simply an impossible feat of
imagination.
It is just that pretense, however, that the myth of "Freedom of Contract"
represents, which explains why every attempt to draw out the myth's
implications have ended in contradiction. The utter futility of trying to
comprehend the meaning of an isolated human encounter, wrenched out
of the context of social understandings in which it occurred, has necessarily demanded in each case the creation of some other context to make
sense of the situation. But because "values" are just as inextricably
interwoven into our common life as are "facts," this purportedly neutral
selection of a conceptual framework cannot escape passing judgment, not
only on what we are, but also on what we ought to be. The law's flight
from normative choice in pursuit of objectivity consequently comes to
rest in the necessity of commitment which it had sought to evade. Captured
by the myth's illusion that the escape has succeeded, however, the law
deteriorates into commitment by default: an automatic and unthinking
affirmation of the very structures of power and domination that our pursuit
of justice was meant to subvert. Under the banner of liberty, the law has
demeaned our nature, dismissed our aspirations, and made us servile.
Once we see that this pattern of legitimation is not ordained in logic
but is adopted by choice, we have liberated our imaginations to conceive
of other ways of structuring our lives together. As the veil of the myth
falls from our eyes, those divergent possibilities that had before seemed
as shadows begin to take on form and substance, and soon we come to
see them everywhere. We learn to recognize the face of community-of
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fairness, of conscience, of social obligation-which is so familiar to us
in the setting of our moral tradition, when it also appears within the fabric
of the law. And once we recognize it there, the visage won't go away.
We find it interwoven throughout legal doctrine, animating its history,
explaining its inconsistencies, illuminating its basic texts. Finally, we are
fully struck by the wild implausibility of the atomistic myth, the absurd
notion that an isolated human activity (like promising-or like signing a
document) can be interpreted and assessed in a moral vacuum, stripped
of all the richness of our normative understandings that give the act its
meaning.
So the choice is ours. The legal materials we need to better construct
our lives together lie before us. The cases, the Restatement, the Codeall can come alive within our hands to fashion the world of commerce
in the image of human concern and decency, if only we have the vision
to use them. But use them we must, in some way, of necessity. If not
with vision, then blindly; and if not to create a better world, then to create
a worse one.

